Texas 2014 Ebola Response, Lessons Learned and Next Steps

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Ebola Background

 Discovered in 1976 near the Ebola River in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo



- Causes Ebola hemorrhagic fever
- Likely carried by bats; Cause disease in humans and nonhuman primates (monkeys, gorillas, and chimpanzees)
- Five identified Ebola virus species, four of which are known to cause disease
 - Ebola virus (Zaire ebolavirus)
 - Sudan virus (Sudan ebolavirus)
 - Tai Forest virus (Tai Forest ebolavirus, formerly Côte d'Ivoire ebolavirus)
 - Bundibugyo virus (Bundibugyo ebolavirus)
 - Reston virus (Reston ebolavirus)


West Africa Ebola 2014-2015

1976-2013 Outbreaks


- 24 previous outbreaks
- 2,400 cases
- 1,597 deaths, 66% case fatality ratio
- Largest single outbreak, 2000-2001,
 Uganda, 425 Cases, 224 Deaths (53%)

2014-2015 Outbreak

- >10 times larger than all previous
 Ebola outbreaks combined
- 26,290 cases
- 10,890 deaths, 41% case fatality ratio
 Data current as of 1 May 2015







Ebola 2014
West Africa



Ebola 2014 International

U.S. Diagnosed Ebola Cases = 4

On September 30, 2014, first Ebola case diagnosed in the United States

- Traveler from Liberia to Dallas, Texas
- Patient died on October 8

On October 10, Dallas healthcare worker tested positive for Ebola

 Patient recovered and discharged from the NIH Clinical Center on October 24

On October 15, second Dallas healthcare worker tested positive for Ebola

Patient recovered and discharged from Emory Hospital on October 28

On October 23, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene reported a case of Ebola

- Medical worker returned to New York City from Guinea after serving with Doctors Without Borders
- The patient recovered and was discharged from Bellevue Hospital Center on November 11

Ebola Disease Progression



Day 7-9
Headache,
fatigue, fever,
muscle
soreness

© 2014 MCT




Day 10
Sudden high
fever, vomiting
blood, passive
behavior



Day 11

Bruising, brain damage, bleeding from nose, mouth, eyes, anus



Loss of consciousness, seizures, massive internal bleeding, death

Source: U.S. Centers for Disease and Control, BBC

Graphic: Melina Yingling

First Diagnosed Ebola Case in North America

- Thomas Eric Duncan, 42 years old
- September 19, Departs Liberia
- September 20, Arrives in Dallas, Texas
- September 24, Onset of symptoms
- September 25, Seeks care
 - Receives antibiotics
- September 28, Admitted to ICU
- September 30, Confirmed Ebola Virus Disease (EVD)
- October 8, Duncan dies
- Diverse contacts






First Nurse Diagnosed


- 26 year old nurse
- Cared for Mr. Duncan
- October 8, Duncan dies
- October 11, Nurse tests EVD positive
- October 16, Transferred to NIH facility in Bethesda, Maryland
- October 24, Discharged
- Limited contacts





Second Nurse Diagnosed

- 29 year old nurse
- Cared for Mr. Duncan
- October 8, Duncan died
- October 10, nurse flew to Cleveland
- October 13, Flew back to Dallas
 - Was self-monitoring and reporting her temperature
 - Called the CDC, Temp 99.5F (37.5C)
 - CDC testing criteria is 100.4F (38C)
- October 15, Tests positive for EVD and transferred to Emory in Atlanta
- October 28, Discharged
- Large number of contacts






Situational Awareness

- Response operations in Dallas
- Rapidly changing
- State Medical Operations Center (SMOC)
 - Response Operations
 - Programmatic Operations
- Emergency Management
 - State Operations Center (SOC)
 - Disaster District Committee (DDC)
- WebEOC





Texas State Medical Operations Center (SMOC) ICS Structure



Specific Ebola Protocols Lacking

- State rapidly developed protocols for:
 - 911 Call Takers
 - EMS Practices
 - Hospital Patient Screening
 - Lab Submission
 - Mortality Planning





PPE Debate

"In western Africa now there is a need for rational and efficient use of protective equipment... achieved by communicating a consistent message that the disease is essentially transmitted through direct contact. In control of infectious diseases, more is not necessarily better and, very often, the simplest answer is the best."

Martin-Moreno, JM, Llinás, G, and Martínez Hernández, J. Is respiratory protection appropriate in the Ebola response?. Lancet. 2014; 384: 856



PPE Debate

The scientific community must argue for the most conservative infection control responses that make sense in light of the present data. I believe the authors (Previous Slide) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have failed to do that and in so doing, have imperiled individuals unnecessarily.

Ryschon TW. Ebola control measures and inadequate responses. Lancet. 2014; 384 (9949): 1181–1182, 27








Key Highlights

- Repeated infection control training for all healthcare workers involved in the care of an Ebola patient
- Recommended PPE should have no skin exposed
- Upgrade to N95 or PAPR
- Identified <u>onsite manager</u> and trained observers


NOTE: Highlights added by presenter

CDC'S PROTECTIVE GEAR CHANGES FOR HEALTH WORKERS

PREVIOUS GUIDELINES



NEW GUIDELINES



Response Challenges: Ground Transportation

- Index patient transport not informed
- Requires pre-planning and advanced training
- 911 Public Safety Answering Points
- Must establish:
 - Appropriate PPE
 - Appropriate competency to utilize PPE
- Known vs unknown risk
- Risk stratified
 - Head to toe impermeable barriers with the powered air purified respirators
 - N95, goggles, and Tychem full body fluid impermeable suit






Response Challenges: Air Transportation

- Requires pre-planning and advanced training
- Establish infection control protocols in advance and implement throughout the process
- Training must include
 - Clinical management
 - Infection control
 - Personal protective equipment (PPE)
- Portable Isolation unit recommended





Ebola Treatment Centers Nebraska Medical Center Example



 Negative air flow with greater than 15 air exchanges per hour



 Pass through sterilizer to disinfect materials leaving the unit



· High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration system




 Dunk tank to decontaminate lab specimens leaving the unit



 Secured access. separate staff entrances and exits



 Close proximity to the Nebraska **Public Health** Biosafety 3 Laboratory



 Staff decontamination shower



 HEPA patient transport system

Source: Nebraska Medical Center Broshic: Greg Good

Waste Management

- Not a public health area of expertise
- Cleaning the apartment
 - How to clean
 - Identifying waste
- Packaging waste
 - Procedures
 - Supplies & equipment
- Transportation
 - Federal DOT Permit Category A Infectious Substance
- Destruction
 - Incineration & ash



Waste Management

Category A Infectious Waste

- From a healthcare setting:
 - Regulated medical waste
 - Properly packaged and labeled
 - State-registered transporters
 - Authorized disposal facilities
- From a non healthcare setting (e.g. residential, hotel, etc.)
 - Classified as special waste and managed as medical waste





Waste Management

Category A infectious waste treatment methods:

- Autoclave: waste placed in pressurized steam
- Incineration: Extremely high temperatures, well above the relatively low temperatures needed to kill Ebola virus
- NOTE: Chemical treatment methods in the US not yet standardized for Category A waste





Contact Tracing

Index patient & nurse contacts

- 177 healthcare worker and community contacts
 - 43 index patient contacts prior to hospitalization
- 165 contacts on flights with Nurse #2
 - Texas, Ohio, and New York
- All cleared by November 7th, after 21 day monitoring period
- Highlighted the need for:
 - More epidemiologists
 - More field epidemiology expertise
 - Better information sharing systems





Dallas County chief epidemiologist Dr. Wendy Chung, far right, and members of her team—from left, Sonya Hughes, Emily Hall, and Sibeso Joyner

Pets and Ebola

- Pet issues in recent disasters
- Outcry Spanish nurse's dog
- Poorly understood Ebola risk
- Protocols were non-existent
- Dallas Nurse's small dog
 - Transported to Hensley Field,
 Decommissioned Naval Air Station
 - 21 day quarantine
 - Texas A&M vet providers
- Recommendation: Those being monitored for EVD should avoid pets





Control Orders

Control orders issued for:

- People
- Places
- Pets
- Possessions

Challenges include:

- Resistance
- Frustration
- Housing, food and other basic needs









Sample Control Order Message

"Under the authority of Texas [law] you are hereby ordered...to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of this disease in this state:"

"Remain at [ADDRESS]. You will not be permitted to leave..."

"You are not to allow or otherwise permit any visitors..."

"Monitor yourself for symptoms ..."

"Make yourself available...for diagnostic testing..."



"If you do not comply with these control measures you may be subject to criminal prosecution..."

This Order will remain in effect until you are notified in writing that the incubation period has passed

Public Perception



Erroneous Public Perceptions

- Inflated Ebola risk
- Conspiracy Theories
- Racism Accusations
- Overreactions

News Headline, "Schools in Ohio, Texas closed over Ebola fears"





In Belton, Tex., on Friday, environmental workers prepared to disinfect North Belton Middle School, which had been closed because of the Ebola scare.

Credit Rusty Schramm/The Temple Daily Telegram, via Associated Press

Behavioral Health Interventions



Issues

- Diverse psych needs of the public, infected patients, family members, healthcare workers, and other responders
- Distress with perceived or actual exposure (Psychological First Aid)
- Grief counseling
- Involuntary control orders
 - Including a homeless individual

Behavioral Health Interventions



Lessons Learned

- Early integration of a behavioral health response
- Consensus on sharing sensitive health information
- Recognition that infectious disease disasters can change the usual response framework and process
- Develop homeless population contingency plans
- Interagency collaboration to develop an overall behavioral health treatment plan

Fatality Management

Post-mortem Checklist

Phase I

 Notify next of kin, State Health Commissioner, and local elected officials

Phase II

 Additional notifications and mortuary services procedures initiated

Phase III

Coordinate press release

Exent(s)	Responsible for	Comments	
	Notification		
	Phase I		
Patient express		-	
Notification of next of kin (NOK)	Hogust	Ensure primary NOK received confluence before contacting other NOK	
DIRES Commissioner receives notification	Hospital		
Dallas County Judge receives muffestion	Hospital		
City Mayor receives notification	DSJIS Commissioner		
State antification: (A) DSHS Management (B) Governor	DSHS Commissioner		
Phase II		The second second	
Confirm NOK contacted	Dallas County Judge	KIND OF THE REAL PROPERTY.	
Dallas County Medical Examiner receives notification	Dallas County Judge	Or after hours on duty buckup	
Dullas County Health and Human Services Director receives notification	Dallas County Judge		
Dallas County Office of Homeland Security receives notification	Dullas County Judge	Duty Officer	
Confirm ME issuance of cremation waiver	Dallas County Judge Staff	State and the state of the stat	
Delivery of signed DSHS Control Order to Hospital	DSHS Commissioner Staff		
Mintuary Service receives patification	DSHS Stuff	Provide meetaary services with NOK information	
Notification to low enforcement for escort.	Dallas County Judge	To escort mortuary services vehicle from the hospital to crematorium	
Delivery of signed Control Order to Mortuary Services	Hospital		
Mortany Services post mortem procedures 1. Body removed from hospital 2. Body errored 3. Body cremation 4. Neitification at start of and completion of cremation to Dill's Commissioner 5. Disposition of asiles	Mortuary Services	Moreasy Services follow CDC guidence for handling body Movement of body from haspital (excert by LE) follow CDC guidence for committee of body	
Notification to Murtuary Services of NOK desire for fisposition of astes	Hospital	If unable to determine at this time, Mortuary Services will follow up with NOK	
Phase III		ALE SHEET ST	
Develop and finalize Press Release statement		Coordination of agencies	
Hospital Press Release Notification: (A) Org. (B) PIOs Dissemination of statement and Press Releases	DSHS Dallas (city) Dallas County DSHS Communicater Dallas County Judge		

Fatality Management

- Mr. Duncan's body was "double-bagged" in zippered bags (CDC Policy)
- Bioseal bag was added by Texas-based Global Mortuary Affairs (mortuary contractor)
 - Approved for air transport of un-embalmed remains
 - Assures no leaks are possible
 - Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) approved
 - Costs about \$65 per bag
- Cremation
 - Placed directly into the retort and incinerated
 - Duncan's cremains were sealed into a BioSeal pouch for presentation to the family.
- Legal issues of cremains possession



Texas Monitoring Travelers from West Africa

	ly under toring	No Longer being Monitored		
Low Risk	High/Some Risk	Number Transferred Out of State	Number Completed Monitoring	Total Assigned to Texas to Date
65	4	102	358	529

Data as of 04/05/2015

Persons under active monitoring who develop signs or symptoms compatible with Ebola Virus Disease

Contact relevant state or local public health authority

Refer for evaluation and possible testing (based on the state's plan) to an Ebola Assessment Hospital or Ebola Treatment Center ⁴ Interim Guidance for Hospital Preparedness for Evaluation,
Testing, and Management of Patients under Investigation or with
Confirmed Ebola Virus Disease (EVD)

Capabilities

PPE¹ Needs

 Care for and manage patient throughout disease process Maintain Ebola PPE² sufficient for at least 7 days of patient care

- Evaluate and care for patient for up to 96 hours or until discharged or transferred
 Initiate Ebola testing and transport patient
- Initiate Ebola testing and transport patient to Ebola treatment Center if lab-confirmed EVD
- Staff trained and proficient in donning/doffing, proper waste management, infection control practices and specimen transport
- The use of PPE should be based on the patient's clinical status³
- Maintain Ebola PPE² sufficient for 4-5 days of patient care

Frontline Healthcare Facilities

Ebola

Treatment

Centers

Ebola

Assessment

Hospitals

- Identify patients with relevant exposure history⁵ and Ebola-compatible symptoms
- Isolate patients
- Inform health department
- Initiate testing if low risk; high risk should be transferred for evaluation and testing
- Staff trained on specimen transport, waste management, Standard Precautions; proficient in donning/doffing

- The use of PPE should be based on the patient's clinical status³
- PPE for clinically stable patients³ should be sufficient for most patients
- Maintain access to Ebola PPE² sufficient for 12-24 hours of patient care, to be used if needed

Next Steps

- Ongoing Traveler Monitoring
- Public Health Capacity and Coordination
- Healthcare Systems Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
- Hospital Readiness and Capabilities
 - Planning, Training, Exercises, PPE
- Hospital Infrastructure
 - Infection Control, Patient Flow, Waste Management
- EMS and 911 Systems Preparedness

Conclusion

- Ebola posed unique challenges
- Lessons and practices inform future responses
- What we knew October 2014 is changing
 - Numerous protocols now exist
 - Expanded planning, training, and exercise activities
- Core public health practices were effective in controlling the spread of Ebola Virus in the U.S.
- More information:
 - Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, <u>www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/</u>
 - Texas Department of State Health Services, <u>www.texasebola.org</u>
 - Texas Infectious Disease Readiness, http://txidr.org/